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Abstract 
This article argues that the legal trial against Generals Efraín Ríos Montt and José 
Mauricio Rodriguez Sánchez for genocide and crimes against humanity has evidenced 
the interplay between the complex factors shaping post-conflict reconstruction and 
social reconciliation in post-genocide Guatemala, and, ultimately, the disjunctive 
impact of the country’s peace process. The ‘genocide trial’ then is about more than a 
legal process, but rather represents a thermometer for Guatemala’s peace process and, 
ultimately, for testing the nature and stability of the post-genocide / post-conflict 
conjuncture. Acknowledgement and interiorisation of human rights frameworks and 
justice mechanisms by indigenous and human rights activists, including of the 
Genocide Convention, has consolidated a partial rights culture. However, the trial and 
the overturning of its verdict have simultaneously evidenced the instability, fragility 
and disjunctive nature of post-conflict peace and the continuing impact of the profound 
legacy of the genocide and of social authoritarianism. The article argues that whilst the 
trial has wielded broad impact within both state institutions and society, ultimately 
consolidating indigenous political actors, it has simultaneously fortified spoilers and 
evidenced indigenous collective memory as a contested sphere, characterised by 
fractures within indigenous experience and recollection.  
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Introduction 
 
In March 2013, Generals Efraín Ríos Montt and José Mauricio Rodriguez Sánchez 
were put on trial in Guatemalan domestic courts for genocide and crimes against 
humanity. The trial lasted only 53 days, ending in the indictment of Ríos Montt and the 
acquittal of Rodriguez Sánchez. This article argues that the legal trial against Generals 
Efraín Ríos Montt and José Mauricio Rodriguez Sánchez has evidenced the interplay 
between the complex factors shaping post-conflict reconstruction and social 
reconciliation in post-genocide Guatemala, and, ultimately, the disjunctive impact of 
the country’s peace process. The ‘genocide trial’ then represents more than a legal 
process, but rather, acts as a thermometer for Guatemala’s peace process and, 
ultimately, for testing the nature and stability of the post-genocide / post-conflict 
conjuncture. 
  
It is argued here that, in the wake of genocide, the peace process consolidated a 
negative peace within which a degree of institutional reform and strengthening was 
implemented, including within the security sector. Simultaneously, human rights, 
victims’ and, emphatically, indigenous organisations were strengthened by the peace 
process (which organisations themselves shaped), ultimately resulting in the 
unprecedented visibility and empowerment of indigenous actors. The context of the 
peace negotiations has precipitated the acknowledgement and interiorisation of human 
rights frameworks and justice mechanisms by indigenous and human rights activists, 
including of the Genocide Convention, building upon the partial rights culture 
constructed through the collective political action of social movements and armed 
struggle predating the peace process. This, in turn, has led to recognition of the 
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irreversibility of rights (demands) for certain sectors. These factors, combined with 
changes within the Public Prosecutor’s Office (MP), were critical in generating the 
conditions for, and carrying out of the ‘genocide trial’. 
  
However, the annulment of the trial has simultaneously evidenced the instability, 
fragility and disjunctive nature of post-conflict peace and the continuing impact of the 
profound legacy of the genocide and of social authoritarianism. The limitations of the 
peace accords were important in this regard, including lack of recognition of the 
genocide as an episode in the conflict, the absence of transitional justice mechanisms 
that would guarantee justice for past crimes, and restricted engagement with the causes 
of the conflict. These factors have strengthened the position of spoilers and, combined 
with acute ongoing racism, deep polarisation and elite intransigence to distribute 
wealth and permit challenge to their historical racial privileges, have come to represent 
the key obstacles for social reconciliation in Guatemala. The article argues that whilst 
the trial has wielded broad impact within both state institutions and society, ultimately 
consolidating indigenous actors, it has simultaneously fortified spoilers and evidenced 
indigenous collective memory as a contested sphere. Moreover, it is argued that 
impunity for the genocide demonstrates how Guatemalan society has yet to ‘recognise’ 
the indigenous population as ‘deserving of humanity’, neutering the power of rights 
claims and validating the genocide. The article is composed of four sections. Firstly, a 
brief exploration of the political and social conditions that led to the genocide, turning 
subsequently to a description of the genocide itself. Secondly, the article examines the 
relevance of the peace process to the genocide trial. The research subsequently 
explores the dynamics that led to the legal investigation and prosecution and presents 
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an analysis of the trial’s impact. The article closes with final considerations relating to 
the meaning of the trial in the post-genocide context. 
Research is based upon direct experience as part of the original team that prepared the 
evidence against Ríos Montt and fieldwork carried out in Guatemala in the wake of the 
trial. The theoretical framework employed brings together the disciplines of critical 
peace studies, genocide studies and political science.  
 
The Guatemalan Genocide 
 
Guatemala’s armed conflict (1960-1996) was precipitated, when, in the wake of the 
1954 CIA-orchestrated coup against reformist President Jacopo Arbenz, the first 
guerrilla emerged to oppose the closure of formal political channels and challenge the 
control of economic resources by a racist, non-indigenous, Spanish-descended 
oligarchy. As Casaús Arzú has eloquently evidenced, it was the protection by the 
armed forces of this caste system of economic and political privilege that would 
undergird and determine the course of the conflict and genocide. Structural racism 
against the indigenous population played a key role here.i In the wake oft he overthrow 
of Arbenz, Guatemala became an anticommunist model in the Hemisphere, a 
development crucial for understanding the roots of the counterinsurgency 
extermination plans. However, whilst the conflict was shaped by the political, 
economic and ideological logic of the Cold War, however, Guatemalans themselves 
decisively sculpted the trajectory of the conflict and nature of the violence, bestowing 
upon it its systematic brutality, a dynamic commonplace throughout the broader Latin 
American region, as Grandin has convincingly argued.ii  
 
 7 
The armed conflict was characterised by a series of phases, with the background to the 
genocide explicitly embedded within counterinsurgency operations implemented 
during the early 1980s. At this time, as a result of a successful urban campaign against 
the guerrilla, the military had gathered what it believed to be reliable intelligence 
evidencing insurrection by a mass social base – allegedly of over 200,000 people – and 
liberated zones in the indigenous western highlands of the country.iii It had been here 
where, for almost a decade, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), and later, the 
Revolutionary Organisation of People in Armes (ORPA), had begun to incorporate the 
indigenous population en masse into its ranks and contrive its social base. In the wake 
of the 1979 victory of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) guerrilla in 
Nicaragua, as the insurgency increasingly gained a foothold in the country, 
Guatemala’s military machine – trained and financed by the United States, Chile, 
Argentina and Israel – prepared its strategic response. Guatemala was not to be another 
Nicaragua.  
 
During the administration of General Lucas García (1978-1982), the logic of mass 
violence focused on both indigenous and non-indigenous populations evolved. Lucas 
sought to consolidate control over an increasingly powerful guerrilla by subordinating 
the state to militarized security and embedding the practice of mass killing into state 
policy. The indigenous highlands increasingly became a central zone of contention in 
the theatre of war and indigenous communities became key targets of the 
counterinsurgency violence. However, the military did not unleash its demons 
immediately. Rather, it initiated intelligence gathering visits to indigenous 
communities with the aim of winning hearts and minds, including by building schools 
and health centres. Simultaneously, the army perpetrated arbitrary acts of violence in 
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said communities as it pressured for intelligence concerning the insurgents.iv As this 
strategy proved increasingly ineffective against the guerrilla, military actions evolved. 
A strategy of selective repression (threats, disappearance, killings) was subsequently 
employed, which, however, only served to push substantial numbers of civilians 
toward the guerrilla.v In this context, a campaign of collective repression, culminating 
in genocide, followed, orchestrated through the Central Command structure, as 
Guatemalan generals learnt from their US counterparts the lethal efficiency of 
‘draining the sea to kill the fish’. 
 
Consequently, under then dictator General Ríos Montt, between 1982 and 1983, 
campaign Victoria 82 imposed a top-down, systematic scorched earth policy of 
extraordinary brutality against indigenous communities identified as the internal enemy 
through the framework of the US National Security Doctrine.vi Targetting indigenous 
regions, the campaign sought to wipe out the guerrilla’s support base by burning down 
villages, killing animals and destroying crops (to starve communities out), torture and 
forced sterilisation of and mass public sexual violence against indigenous women and 
young girls.vii The cornerstone of the systematically planned strategy, as would be 
demonstrated in the trial, became the massacres committed against unarmed 
indigenous communities identified as zones of guerrilla support. Over 1000 massacres 
following the same pattern were perpetrated, carried out typically on Sundays or 
holidays, when there would likely be a higher concentration of villagers present. In the 
Ixil region, an indigenous region where the guerrilla commanded high levels of 
indigenous participation, the massacres and the displacement precipitated by the 
violence were of extraordinary brutality, and led to a 26% reduction in the 
population.viii  
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The unequivocal consequence of the genocidal scorched earth campaign was the rapid 
and effective strategic defeat of the insurgency by mid-1984, as, bereft of its social 
base, the guerrilla retreated to strategic zones and neighbouring countries. A return to 
(military-controlled) civilian rule followed in 1986. The genocide left indigenous rural 
Guatemala devastated and highly militarised. The CEH concluded that the acute ethnic 
dimension of the armed conflict was evidenced through the fact that 82% of the 
200,000 victims had been indigenous.  
 
The genocide under Ríos Montt represented an albeit brief episode within the broader 
framework of the country’s internal armed conflict and counterinsurgency, supporting 
insight from wider scholarship that genocide has historically tended to occur within the 
context of war and counterinsurgency.ix In Valentino’s words, ‘mass killing is often a 
calculated military strategy used by regimes attempting to defeat major guerrilla 
insurgencies’.x Leiby has argued that the function of the violence, particularly the 
sexual violence, had been to disincentivise (potential) guerrilla supporters, many of 
whom were indigenous.xi In this regard, mass killing emerged precisely ‘when 
powerful groups come to believe that it is the best available means to accomplish 
certain radical goals, counter specific types of threat, or solve difficult military 
problems’.xii  
 
As a former advisor to the Guatemalan Peace Commission has stated, ‘The war let all 
the demons free, instrumentalising the army and demonstrating the oligarchy’s deep 
fear of losing its power and privilege’.xiii Mass killing and unhinged cruelty in this 
context represented the central strategy through which the armed forces would defend 
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elite economic interests against the direct threat of the guerrilla and the wider 
perceived threat posed by the impoverished majority indigenous population that came 
to embody the guerrilla’s social base; in short, the ‘indian threat’. Significantly, the 
economic elite itself played an explicit role in the violence, initially organising and 
controlling urban death squads in the 1970s, subsequently financing military operations 
and, allegedly, placing its property and private helicopters at the service of the armed 
forces, in the latter case including during massacres.xiv Whilst the economic elite and 
Guatemalan state did indeed face an imminent existential threat from the guerrrilla, 
historical conditions of structural and institutional racism concurrently left the 
indigenous population vulnerable to mass violence.xv As Midlarsky has convincingly 
argued, ‘Any process that simultaneously increases both threat to the state and its 
vulnerability, as well as the vulnerability of a targeted civilian population, also 
increases the probability of genocide’.xvi Framed within the geopolitical dynamics of 
Latin America’s Cold War, where decisive US support endorsed the regional anti-
communist struggle by any means necessary, genocide became an imaginable and 
practicable option. 
 
The motive behind Guatemala’s genocide was intimately shaped by the 
counterinsurgency campaign. However, the essentialist violence characterising the 
genocide also served a nation-building function. The inter-ethnic violence perpetrated 
by the military against indigenous communities can be understood as representing 
those actions deemed necessary to purify and construct a consolidated whitened, 
homogeneous nation-state, as Semelin has explored in his scholarship.xvii Mass killing 
was determined by ‘the quest for purity’ and wielded through an ‘eliminationist 
ideology’,xviii aimed at engineering a ‘permitted indian’, civil, modernised and passive, 
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within a re-engineered nation-state.xix Key to this process was the mobilisation of an 
ideology of ethnic hatred by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’,xx in this case the military high 
command. Said disourse sought to generate the belief in the natural and immutable 
inferiority of sub-human indigenous peoples, based upon invented criteria of 
biological, cultural and moral difference. As Ignatieff has evidenced elsewhere, 
dehumanisation in this case also sought to make the killing easier;xxi from this 
perspective, the indigenous were sub-human, nothing more than savage. Concurrently, 
the discourse operationalised by the military high command constructed and 
instrumentalised a framework of ‘moral grievance’ against the targetted group. Troops 
were motivated to believe that the massacres represented a legitimate mechanism 
through which to ‘struggle against the perceived deviance’ of the subversive 
indigenous other, representing, in part, violence as punishment.xxii In the aftermath of 
the armed conflict and, significantly, during the trial itself, the dehumanisation of the 
threatening and deviant indigenous other has remained a prevalent and socially 
legitimate discourse, representing a central facet of the legacy of genocide. As the 
prosecution of Montt evidenced, for the economic and political elite, the perceived 
‘indian threat’ remains very real. 
 
The Peace Process 
 
Guatemala was returned to civilian rule after the political transition (1983–85) ended 
and civilian President Vinicio Cerezo assumed office in January 1986. However, the 
military, jubilant and institutionally consolidated in the wake of the 
counterinsurgency’s strategic victory, never meaningfully relinquished power. The 
early stages of Guatemala’s peace process began only shortly afterwards, linked to the 
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onset of the regional peace process, Esquipulas II, in 1987. With the end of the Cold 
War, the search for peace began in earnest, the national process being consolidated in 
1994 with the established presence of the United Nations Verification Mission in 
Guatemala (MINUGUA). 
Between 1994 and 1996, seventeen peace accords addressing operative and substantive 
themes were signed between successive governments and the URNG, and subsequently 
monitored and verified by MINUGUA. The peace process successfully orchestrated 
the end to formal hostilities, legitimised victims’ demands relating to human rights and 
indigenous rights, and facilitated the empowerment of civil society organisations. The 
accompanying consolidation of a partial rights culture opened a space for growing 
demands from increasingly visible civil society actors, including victims of the 
genocide, for justice, truth and reparations relating to the past violence. Victims learnt 
human rights frameworks, including those relative to international crimes such as 
genocide and crimes against humanity. They subsequently came to recognise the 
irreversibility of their rights and the state’s correlative obligations in this regard. As 
one human rights leader stated, ‘We have learnt our rights, and we can not unlearn 
them: central to our struggles are now is the demand for their recognition’.xxiii 
Provisions related to institutional strengthening also guaranteed partial transformation 
of the justice system, including, specifically, the establishment of units within the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office to investigate past human rights violations. Said conditions 
were key to the development of the trial. 
At the same time, the peace process sought to engineer the establishment of those 
conditions to bring about a definitive end to the causes and consequences of the 
conflict. Limited implementation of the accords, however, restricted their possible 
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impact in this respect. Moreover, the design of the process itself ultimately thwarted 
possibilities for effective post-conflict reconstruction and sustainable peace. As a result 
of the systematic reticence of Guatemalan elites to engage directly with the structural 
causes of conflict (unequal distribution and control of land; horizontal inequalities), the 
accords excluded relevant provisions in this regard, subsequently impeding enduring 
transformation.xxiv Furthermore, and significantly, no recognition of the genocide by 
the parties to the conflict was formally given. The genocide was not referred to in the 
accords, nor did they establish mechanisms through which to bring its perpetrators to 
account, unlike in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia. Arguably then, despite 
considerable reference to victims of the conflict, the peace process showed disdainful 
disregard for the genocide and its victims, strengthening the regime of denial assumed 
by state, political and economic elite actors for whom the genocide remained a fiction. 
Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
During the peace process, two amnesty laws were passed, in 1986 and 1996 
respectively. The first law gave amnesty provision to those accused of political or 
related common crimes. The second law, the National Reconciliation Law (1996) 
consecrated ‘total release from penal responsibility for political crimes committed 
during the armed internal confrontation’ and ‘the total release from penal responsibility 
for common crimes … connected to’ such political crimes (Articles 2 and 4). However, 
and significantly, the law also stated ‘The release from penal responsibility … does 
neither apply to crimes of genocide, torture and forced disappearance nor to the crimes 
which are not subject to limitations’ (Article 8). Ríos Montt and Rodriguez Sánchez 
have systematically appealed to the provisions of the aforementioned amnesties, a 
tactic that has continually impeded advances in the case. 
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Significantly, after El Salvador, the Guatemalan case represents one of the first of its 
kind where broader transitional justice mechanisms, historically embedded in Latin 
American experience since the publication of the Argentinian truth commission report 
Nunca Más in 1984, became central to a formal peace process.xxv In this respect, the 
country’s Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), established through the Oslo 
Accord (1994), was mandated to clarify human rights violations and acts of violence, 
prepare a report documenting said findings and ‘formulate specific recommendations 
to encourage peace and national harmony’.xxvi  
The final report of the CEH, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, was presented in 
Guatemala in 1999. At its official launch, then President Alvaro Arzú refused to accept 
and thus acknowledge the report publicly, likely due to the conclusions presented 
therein. The report found that the military had been responsible for 83% of the human 
rights violations perpetrated during the conflict and that the state had been responsible 
for carrying out acts of genocide in four regions of the country between 1981 and 
1983, crimes allegedly committed during the wider counterinsurgency campaign. Of 
significant importance in this regard was the CEH’s recommendation to ‘prosecute, try 
and punish’ those crimes not extinguished by the 1996 amnesty law, including 
particularly genocide, torture and forced disappearance’.xxvii Whilst the mandate of the 
CEH prevented the individualisation of responsibility and use as direct evidence in 
judicial cases, its findings and corresponding recommendations undergirded the 
justification for and development of the genocide case. 
 
Arzú’s reaction personified the profound contempt that the political and economic 
establishment felt towards the victims of the conflict and the genocide narrative itself. 
Arguably, the public rebuttal of the CEH, and the killing by military officials of Bishop 
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Juan Gerardi in April 1998, only hours after the publication of the Catholic Church’s 
truth commission, Guatemala Never Again, which Gerardi directed, were key markers 
in Guatemala’s post-genocide trajectory. Both events exposed the lengths to which 
those involved (in-) directly in the perpetration of the genocide would go to deny it, 
repudiate its victims, and silence their advocates, conduct that would subsequently be 
replicated during the genocide trial. Moreover, whilst in the aftermath of the genocide 
the country’s past logically remained contested, the brutal refutation of subaltern truth 
implicating military, political and economic elites in mass killing demonstrated the 
absurd and fictitious nature of Guatemala’s post-war reconciliation. Nevertheless, and 
significantly, it was within this fragile and violent post-conflict scenario that the 
foundations were established to bring the former generals to trial. 
 
The Case Against Ríos Montt and Rodriguez Sánchez 
 
On 19 March 2013, Ríos Montt and Rodriguez Sánchez went on trial for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in the Ixil region between 1982 
and 1983. The prosecution was not, however, an isolated case, but rather formed part 
of the ‘justice cascade’,xxviii characterised in Latin America by wide-ranging domestic 
prosecutions for international crimes against former Heads of State and lower level 
military officials.xxix In the case of Guatemala, as elsewhere, the push, at least initially, 
to investigate past crimes was not state-driven; civil society organisations filed legal 
cases in Guatemala, as well as in Spain and Belgium. Given the absence of state-led 
initiatives and the fragility of state institutions, human rights and victims’ organisations 
assumed the central role in ‘building criminal cases and providing services and security 
for victims’.xxx Ongoing struggles for justice built upon the demands of indigenous and 
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human rights organisations that had emerged prior to the peace process, for example of 
the Ethnic Council Runujel Junam (CERJ) and the Mutual Support Group (GAM), 
shaping new forms of political agency from within civil society. 
 
Two civil society organisations led the genocide investigation as querellantes 
adhesivos (partie civil in civil law systems): the Association for Justice and 
Reconciliation (AJR), an organisation of indigenous genocide survivors established in 
2000 representing 22 communities, and the Centre for Human Rights Legal Action 
(CALDH), a human rights organisation formed in 1994 and based in Guatemala City. 
AJR-CALDH initially presented two cases for genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. The first case against former President Romeo Lucas García and his 
military high command was presented in 2000, with the case against Ríos Montt and 
his high command subsequently presented in 2001.  
 
Key to the development of the case was the mobilisation of over one hundred 
indigenous survivors of the genocide from five regions of Guatemala who organised 
through the AJR to formulate and present the evidence that would eventually represent 
the cornerstone of the Montt indictment. The initiative was consolidated by the 
interplay between the massacre survisors and the critical role played by national and 
international lawyers, academics and analysts working through CALDH to weave the 
case together. As a result of said dynamic, in the mid-2000s, a key decision was made 
by AJR-CALDH to focus strategically upon the Ixil as the geographical region for the 
case. Given the dimensions of the violence, the ethnic homogeneity of the region (97% 
ethnic Maya Ixil) and the convincing body of evidence gathered, it was agreed upon 
that a conclusive and compelleing case could be argued for genocide in this region.xxxi 
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As Kemp has correctly indicated, AJR-CALDH played a critical role in locating 
witnesses, taking testimonies, analysing documentation, commissioning expert witness 
reports, providing technical assistance to state prosecutors and delivering psychosocial 
support to victims.xxxii However, this formalist perception overlooks the role of AJR-
CALDH in generating a facilitating environment in which victims of genocide came to 
acknowledge their history through the construction of a collective memory bank, learn 
and demand their rights and build a common struggle based upon their shared 
indigenous identity and legitimate claims to entitlement recognised within national and 
international human rights frameworks. As one survivor recalls, ‘the very act of 
organising through the AJR raised our self-esteem, gave us legitimacy. Human rights 
was a weapon we had, you might say, that empowered us’.xxxiii  
 
The effective organisation of AJR-CALDH was not an isolated incidence of civil 
society mobilisation. Rather, since the mid-1980s, human rights, women’s and 
peasants’ organisations in Guatemala had emerged as key actors, emboldened and 
legitimised by the peace process, which they would, in turn, shape.xxxiv In this respect, 
the argument presented in this research is that the social and political processes that 
engendered the genocide trial, and the indictment of Montt itself, were moulded by the 
successful impact of the peace process in specific arenas. The trial would have been 
unthinkable without the empowerment of civil society actors and the corresponding 
partial rights culture that their mobilisations and advocacy engendered, both of which 
were embedded goals of the negotiations. Moreover, the struggles of human rights 
organisations precipitated key achievements within the courts leading to important 
sentences in cases of human rights violations, a process that emboldened the justice 
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system and weaved significant precedents for the genocide case.xxxv As would become 
clear in the context of the trial, from the perspective of the economic and political 
elites, the process had, in no uncertain terms, created a Frankenstein.  
 
The peace process also sought to precipitate long-term reform of the security and 
justice sectors, through the overall strengthening of state institutions, and, in particular, 
by creating specialised investigative units within the MP and high impact trial courts, 
such as the Tribunal de Alto Riesgo A,xxxvi in which Ríos Montt was tried. Scholars 
have identified the importance of the contribution of capable, autonomous and 
legitimate governmental institutions for the consolidation of a secure and stable post-
conflict environment. Brinkerhoff has further identified a set of core functions – 
security, state effectiveness and state legitimacy – as crucial to post-conflict 
sustainability.xxxvii In a context marked by the absence of effective and impartial state 
institutions, civil society actors had assumed a key role in ‘building criminal cases’. 
Nevertheless, even once the genocide cases were presented, the fragility and lack of 
independence of the justice system continued to impede progress. As interviewees 
stated, after 2002, once testimonies in both cases were filed with the MP, ‘justice 
officials systematically obstructed any advances in the cases, at times intentionally, or 
otherwise due to negligence and lack of capacity’.xxxviii 
 
Without the meaningful operative response of state institutions, civil society efforts to 
bring former Heads of State and military officials to justice were severely hampered 
and the cases languished for several years within the justice system. In 2007, the 
International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG), a UN-supported initiative to 
strengthen the Guatemalan justice system, was established in the country. CICIG’s 
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mandate was to ‘support and assist domestic justice institutions in the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes committed by illegal entities and clandestine security 
apparatuses’.xxxix Consequently, CICIG’s mandate excluded legal cases relating 
explicitly to human rights violations and its presence had no immediate or direct effect 
on the genocide cases. However, CICIG began to exercise an important impact within 
the MP, gradually ‘emboldening the justice system’. Building upon previous 
development cooperation, CICIG collaboration successfully strengthened the 
investigative capacity and independence of the MP. Moreover, in 2010, CICIG played 
a key role in successfully pressuring for the appointment of Claudia Paz y Paz, a 
respected human rights advocate, former magistrate and distinguished lawyer, as 
Guatemala’s Attorney General.xl It would be under Paz y Paz’s mandate that the 
genocide trial would advance irreversibly: the Attorney General and her team of 
advisors demonstrated the necessary political will to push the case forward. As Kemp 
has eloquently argued, Paz y Paz’s appointment demonstrated a ‘political and 
institutional opening’ bolstered by ‘a bank of evidence, analysis and a case theory, as 
well as national lawyers with relevant experience… a strong domestic constituency 
with international networks ready to support prosecutors, judges and witnesses’.xli In 
this context, and with the formal rejection by the trial court of the amnesty appeal in 
2012, the date was set for the trial to go ahead.  
 
The Verdict 
 
The trial against Ríos Montt and Rodriguez Sánchez was expeditious by any standards, 
and particularly in a country where legal processes, in particular those relating to 
human rights violations, have been Sisyphean. The trial was met with unprecedented 
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levels of media coverage, both national and international. At the same time, and 
particularly during moments of temporary legal stalemate, international observers, 
including diplomats, academics and human rights advocates – such as high-level UN 
officials and the US Embassy – attended the trial. In fact, the US Embassy exercised 
continuing strategic support to Paz y Paz and to the trial more generally, support 
wielded within the framework of US development assistance towards strengthening of 
the justice system provided since 1996. Only 53 days passed between the 
commencement of the trial and the verdict, presented on 10 May by the team of judges 
led by Judge Jazmin Barrios. Rodriguez Sánchez, Ríos Montt’s then head of Military 
Intelligence, was acquitted of all charges. Ríos Montt, however, was convicted of 
genocide and humanitarian crimes, a combination of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, and sentenced to serve eighty years in prison. Montt’s conviction represents the 
first of a former head of state in national courts in Latin America for genocide. The 
former dictator is also the highest level military official to be convicted in Guatemala 
after Colonel Juan Valencia Osorio’s conviction for the murder of Myrna Mack in 
1991.  
 
However, and significantly, only ten days later, under unrelenting pressure from elite 
economic, political and military actors, the Constitutional Court (CC) annulled the 
verdict on grounds of due process, supporting claims by Montt’s defence team that 
during the trial he had been left temporarily without legal defence. The trial was 
consequently returned to a prior phase. 
 
The prosection, driven and prepared in part by AJR-CALDH, presented a consolidated, 
exhaustive case, fielding a total of 97 witnesses, 39 forensic experts, and 16 expert 
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witnesses. Of extraordinary significance were the testimonies given by indigenous 
survivors of the violence, in particular those by women who had been victims of sexual 
violence. In harrowing spectacle, attired in traditional Ixil dress, indigenous women 
addressed the court and the accused generals directly in their own language, describing 
in detail the horrific sexual torture and violence to which they had been subjected by 
the Guatemalan military. Said testimonies evidenced the historical victimisation 
suffered by indigenous communities, simultaneously legitimising their historical 
narrative and empowering indigenous actors through singular acts of courage that 
forged their status as subjects of law. The testimonies, interlaced with profound 
physical and emotional distress, left an indelible imprint upon Guatemalan and 
international audiences alike and, ultimately, came to represent a central aspect of the 
body of proof against Montt. At the same time, the prosecution skillfully employed 16 
expert witnesses (peritos especiales) who, on the strength of written reports submitted 
to the MP, testified on themes that were central to the legal charges presented.xlii 
 
Kemp has carried out an exhaustive analysis of the judgement against Ríos Montt,xliii 
and it is not the intention of this article to replicate this. However, in itself, the detail of 
the judgement and the sheer extent of the acts perpetrated within the framework of 
genocide and crimes against humanity that it sanctions, merit mention. The Court 
identified a series of military plans (Victoria 1982, Firmness 1983, Operation Plan 
Sofia) within the framework of which operations were carried out, concluding that the 
content of said plans evidenced planning involving the military chain of command. The 
Court concluded that military operations under Montt caused the death of 1771 
civilians, the forced displacement of 29,000 people, 41 rapes, the torture of 163 people, 
the bombing of 15 communities, and the forced concentration of 1,383 people.xliv 
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The Court held that the attacks against the Ixil ethnic group were systematic, massive 
and indiscriminate, representing a strategy to terrorise, humiliate and destroy the social 
fabric of the Ixil people, which represented four of five constituent acts of the crime of 
genocide perpetrated against members of the Ixil ethnic group (Kemp 2014: 138).xlv In 
this respect, military operations were determined by the intent to eliminate, in part, the 
Ixil ethnic group, a rationale central to the crime of genocide. However, of significant 
importance to the case were the modes of liability evidencing Montt’s direct 
contribution to the crimes, as Kemp has demonstrated. Given his power of military 
command as ‘maximum authority of the de facto government’, the Court held Montt 
responsible for having contributed to the crimes, including through ordering the 
preparation of plans that aimed to precipitate the partial destruction of the Ixil ethnic 
group. Montt was held responsible for approving said plans and ‘ordering and 
authorising their implementation’, as well as for not preventing the crimes that were 
subsequently perpetrated (omission).xlvi 
 
The Impact of the Trial and Verdict 
 
Analysis of the consequences of the trial should differentiate between the impact of the 
initial guilty verdict against Montt and the effect of the reactions to Montt’s indictment 
that subsequently led to the annulment of the trial by the CC. These separate judicial 
decisions taken by distinct courts of law precipitated contradictory consequences, 
ultimately strengthening the opposing narratives and truths fielded by victims and 
perpetrators in the wake of the conflict and arguably exacerbating existing polarisation 
and the dangers of backlash. In this regard, the trial acutely evidenced Guatemala’s yet 
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unresolved dilemma of how it should leave behind its legacy of massive and systematic 
human rights violations and consolidate democracy; in Elster’s words, ‘To move 
forward, we must first come to terms with the past and to move forward, we must 
resolutely ignore the past’.xlvii  
 
Units within the MP and the judiciary exerted a significant degree of independence 
throughout the Montt prosecution, evidencing important advances in capacity building 
within both institutions. The trial demonstrated that specific units within the MP have 
consolidated effective investigative techniques, learnt to apply international law to the 
Guatemalan context and formulate solid bodies of evidence for complex criminal 
cases. These skills were further reinforced by the guilty verdict, bolstering the 
confidence of officials. Whilst the malicious litigation employed so effectively by the 
Montt defence demonstrated the challenges that remain within the legal system, the 
MP has, in general, emerged strengthened as a result of the trial, its legitimacy as a 
competent state institution strengthened. In the words of an official from the MP, ‘The 
MP demonstrated its capacity to carry out criminal prosection, support victims of 
human rights violations and coordinate effectively between institutions, showing how 
it is possible to construct a functioning state in Guatemala’.xlviii 
 
Similarly, the process has bolstered specific authorities within the judiciary, in 
particular the High Impact Court in which Montt and Sánchez were prosecuted. 
However, the decision taken by the CC to annul the trial evidenced the lack of 
independence and politicised nature of the country’s highest court, leaving the system 
itself discredited and delegitimised. According to one of Guatemala’s most eminent 
lawyers, ‘Despite the positive role played by the MP, the CC’s decision consecrated 
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impunity, and set a precedent for the use of malicious litigation as a weapon to be 
employed in high courts and tribunals. The justice system has been profoundly 
weakened and the rule of law seen to be non-existent’.xlix  
 
Beyond the immediate impact in the legal system, the consequences of the trial 
extended outside of the juridical sphere, ebbing into and shaping broader and 
embedded social and political processes associated with the armed conflict and the 
peace negotiations. Political analyst and former guerrilla Miguel Ángel Sandoval 
defined the trial as ‘the national striptease’, given that it allegedly obliged actors from 
across the political spectrum, including on the extreme right, to assume a public 
position concerning the armed conflict, the genocide accusation and ongoing racism. In 
an interview, a functionary from the MP corroborated this position, stating how ‘the far 
right never imagined there would be an Attorney General and judge that would allow 
the case to get to court, let alone commit the barbarity of permitting a sentence for 
genocide to stand. This forced the far right to dirty their hands in public, something 
they had never before done.’l 
 
A major impact of the trial in this respect then was to provoke national debate centring on 
truth and memory, a debate that represented, in effect, a struggle to define the country’s 
recent history. Arguably, with the rebuttal of the CEH’s final report in 1999, indigenous 
victims of past violence were publicly shunned, their experience repudiated and 
discredited. In this regard, the broader social impact of the CEH had been severely 
restricted. However, as Hamber and Wilson have observed, individual and social processes 
in the wake of mass violence, in fact the past itself, may become sites of social struggle 
around which society and state may reintegrate or fracture.li In post-war societies 
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recovering from often protracted and brutal violence, consensus around issues relating to 
the perpetration of past crimes is rarely achieved expediently, particularly when the state 
itself is implicated as perpetrator. Rather, truth-seeking and recovery processes may be 
protracted and disjunctive. As these authors state, ‘The process of breaking a regime of 
denial, addressing and recognising repressed memories, compensating for loss, and 
ultimately arriving at some type of closure and reintegration of liminal subjects, works at 
different levels, i.e. individuals, truth commissions and criminal prosecutions’.lii 
The Montt / Sánchez prosecution represented a traumatic event, forcing Guatemalan 
society to face its most hidden and ferocious demons, demons that had remained in the 
shadows since the end of the peace process. At stake was more than legal truth; in the 
balance was the public etching of history, the assignation of responsibility, the 
validation of historical conduct. As one indigenous leader stated, ‘The genocide trial 
felt like we were transported back to the 1980s. The wounds had never really healed. It 
was like reliving the Cold War all over again. It brought to light the very foundations 
of history and nation’.liii At their own behest, victims were obliged to confront, face to 
face, the architects of their suffering. For survivors from the Ixil, Montt represented 
the, hitherto untouchable, military institution’s most tangible and controversial figure, 
a symbol of the genocide, of historically entrenched racism.liv For the victims, the trial 
and the guilty verdict brought catharsis, a sense of recognition and, to a degree, of 
closure. At the same time, those Guatemalans who had not faced the wrath of 
counterinsurgency, including other indigenous communities from the Ixil itself,lv or 
had in fact been integral to it, were obliged, once again, ‘to encounter the deviant and 
subversive indigenous other, the communist, the one that puts a stone in the shoe of 
progress, modernisation and development’.lvi 
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The trial evidenced fissures within indigenous experience, whilst revealing the fiction 
of reconciliation and the ongoing polarisation that continued to fracture the country 
along the lines of ethnicity, race, class and the rural/urban divide.lvii However, thirty 
years after the massacres, the trial unequivocally forced open a space in which public 
debate on the armed conflict, genocide and sexual violence, muted in the immediate 
aftermath of the violence, was unavoidable. According to one interviewee, 
‘Guatemalans did not read the CEH, it was never taken seriously. But the trial, that was 
different. Imagine how people felt, sitting down to drink a coffee and watch the 
evening news, seeing and hearing the witnesses testify to how they were raped by 
fourteen men, how their families were massacred. It was a national trauma that finally 
broke the silence. The acts became undeniable’.lviii  
 
In this context, the impact that the testimonies and evidence presented had upon the 
national imaginary was critical. As the prosecution unfolded its case, testimony after 
testimony graphically implicated the accused, and the military more widely, in the 
perpetration of egregious crimes. Gradually, the rightwing economic, intellectual and 
political elite, in fact President Pérez Molina himself, felt adequate pressure to respond, 
stating publicly on repeated occasions that, ‘whilst genocide had not been perpetrated, 
excesses were indeed committed within the framework of the armed conflict’.lix Given 
that the military had historically sustained that its conduct had been exemplary and that 
it had not commissioned illegal acts or violations, this admission was of significant 
importance and partially fractured the regime of denial.  
 
The Montt prosecution in this way surpassed the more limited impact of the truth 
commission, initially laying the foundations for the potential construction of a shared 
 27 
collective memory of the armed conflict from the perspective of genocide survivors 
mobilised within the AJR and other similar victims’ organisations, a truth negotiated as 
it had been within the context of the trial. The search for legal truth thus became a 
mechanism through which to contest and reshape a top-down truth imposed by military 
and economic elites, the undisputed victors of the armed conflict. Accordingly, the 
verdict against Montt represented a critical achievement for indigenous and non-
indigenous victims of the conflict alike, although the specific nature of the crime and 
sentence were logically of extraordinary relevance for indigenous peoples. In the 
immediate aftermath of the sentence, human rights, indigenous and women’s 
movements, whose historical struggles had demanded recognition of the violations 
perpertrated by the military and who had converged in the context of the prosecution, 
were vindicated. As one member of the human rights community stated, ‘Indigenous 
victims sat in a court of law, on an equal footing to the former dictator. This court, part 
of a racist exclusionary state, heard their testimonies, and gave them probative value on 
the strength of which Montt was found guilty. This was the moment that forged 
profound unity amongst social movements’.lx The trial served then, at least partially, to 
reintegrate liminal subjects, as Hamber and Wilson have suggested, to reconstruct 
citizenship. 
 
Significantly, according to interviewees from human rights and indigenous 
organisations, a further impact of the process leading up to the genocide trial and of the 
prosecution itself was the creation and consolidation of a dense network of civil society 
actors, generating an alliance between diverse organisations and across ethnic groups 
not seen since the peace process (Brett 2008). After 2012, the articulation between 
human rights, indigenous, peasants and women’s movements supporting the 
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prosecution created a critical mass, a ‘cycle of protest’, as scholar Sidney Tarrow 
defines it. According to Tarrow, cycles of protest are defined as phases of ‘heightened 
conflict and contention across the social system’, including rapid and widespread 
collective action and political mobilisation (1994: 122-125). A female indigenous 
academic commented how ‘The Montt verdict represented a symbol and a rallying 
point for communities. In the context of the trial and longer-term organisational 
processes within indigenous communities confronting mega-projects, indigenous 
communities are now stating how this time they intend to defend their territory. During 
the conflict, they only saw a headless monster, an invisible state. Now they see who the 
monster is, and they know he is vulnerable. This is likely to bring a severe reaction’.lxi  
 
The Consequences and Impact of the Trial Annulment 
 
The euphoria experienced by human rights and indigenous organisations in general, 
and the AJR-CALDH in particular, was never likely to remain anything other than 
fragile and, ultimately, ephemeral. Even prior to the verdict on 10 May, the trial 
proceedings had already precipitated a ‘severe reaction’ to subaltern empowerment: the 
mobilisation and resistance of those powerful and well resourced actors that had 
previously opposed the peace process and subsequently become key spoilers in its 
aftermath.  
 
Members of the economic elite, in particular the heavyweight far right Coordinating 
Committee of Agriculatural, Commerical, Industrial and Financial Associations 
(CACIF), politicians from across the party spectrum, former members of the military 
organised through the Association of Guatemalan Military Veterans (AVEMILGUA), 
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right wing academics, above all from the Francisco Marroquin University, and 
journalists expressed consistent outrage at the prosecution, calling it a circus, a 
vengeful show trial. A non-governmental organisation established during the trial, the 
Foundation Against Terrorism (FAT), became a key vehicle for the extreme right. The 
FAT, whose businessman president Ricardo Méndez Ruiz had been kidnapped by the 
guerrilla during the conflict, has assumed a hardline approach to the trial. The FAT has 
continually defended the military, employing Cold War rhetoric classifying the 
prosecution witnesses and their legal representatives as deviants, terrorists and 
communists,lxii a discourse that still holds sway in Guatemala. At a seminar with the 
private sector in March 2013, Guatemala’s President, who had served in the Ixil region 
during the conflict, publicly assumed a position that genocide had not been perpetrated 
in Guatemala, a perspective reiterated by his Peace Secretary, Antonio Arenales Forno.  
 
A key turning point in the trial that intensified the perfect storm that the guilty verdict 
would eventually confront was the declaration by Hugo Ramiro Leonardo Reyes, a 
former mechanic in the Engineer Corps in the Ixil region. In his testimony on 4 April, 
Reyes identified Guatemala’s President Pérez Molina as having been responsible for 
giving orders carried out from the regional base, including those that culminated in 
executions. Interviewees stated how Reyes’ declaration represented a point of no 
return: ‘once implicated, the President was never going to permit a guilty verdict to 
stand, the trial from that moment was dead in the water, as the Molina leaned on 
related institutions’.lxiii 
 
Significantly, on 16 April, in the wake of the Reyes testimony, and as the possibility of 
a guilty verdict began perhaps to appear less unimaginable, a group of twelve respected 
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politicians, academics, and policymakers (the so-called Twelve Apostles), in many 
cases formerly linked to the peace process and perceived as moderate or left-of-centre, 
published an ominous press release. The press release, entitled ‘To Betray the Peace 
and Divide Guatemala’, indirectly resurrected the ‘indian threat’, declaring that the 
genocide accusation possessed no legal foundation and represented a ‘serious danger to 
the country’ that threatened to ‘exacerbate social and political polarisation’ and 
precipitate the ‘reappearance of political violence’.lxiv The ‘national striptease’ had 
occasioned the emergence of an alliance of powerful and diverse actors that 
condemned the prosecution, bolstering the regime of denial. In the aftermath of the 
verdict, this alliance would become further consolidated. 
 
The reaction of the far right to Montt’s sentencing was unanimous. The verdict could 
and would not be sustained: Guatemala was not Nazi Germany, as its detractors 
repeatedly stated in public and private.lxv It was CACIF, the country’s alleged political 
and economic powerbroker,lxvi that assumed the mantle. CACIF declared itself in 
permanent assembly, a rarely experienced expression of extreme dissent, until the 
verdict or trial were overturned, pressuring the CC to ‘respond to the violations of due 
process that had been committed during the trial and return the country to 
normality’.lxvii  
 
During interviews, the question arose as to why CACIF had exerted such public 
pressure on the judicial system, why it ‘publicly dirtied its hands’, given that 
historically there had been little evident sympathy between CACIF and Montt himself. 
Rodriguez has argued that CACIF’s own analyses during the trial indicated that, if 
Montt were convicted, there was a probability that the Council of State in session 
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during the Montt dictatorship (1982-1983), in which six prominent businessmen had 
participated, could be tried for its actions in support of the counterinsurgency. 
Rodriguez suggests that, in this regard, the organisation met with Zury, Ríos Montt’s 
daughter and a prominent politician, as well as other military officials and their 
families during the trial to formulate strategies.lxviii Interviewees similarly posited that 
the actions of CACIF were shaped by three mutually reinforcing fears. Firstly, that the 
Montt trial was only the beginning: as had been the case in Argentina, further trials 
would follow, pursuing not only the military themselves, but also the private sector that 
had provided decisive logistical support and economic resources for the 
counterinsurgency. The verdict then would potentially have legal consequences for 
members of the private sector. Secondly, the evidence presented in the trial further 
clarified ‘the lengths to which the private sector would go to protect the economic 
model; this could bloody the names of the fathers of the nation, rewrite history’.lxix In 
this regard, CACIF’s reaction was shaped intimately by strategies to protect the honour 
of their families. CACIF’s final fear was related to the economic consequences that a 
guilty verdict could precipitate, potentially unravelling an economic model that had 
hitherto been determined by racial entitlement. An interviewee from CACIF was 
extremely illustrative in this regard: 
 
‘The trial was determined by illegalities and violation of due process… 
However, we could have accepted a conviction for crimes against humanity. 
But some in CACIF felt that a genocide conviction would mean other countries 
would not want to do business with us, with genocidaires. Furthermore, it was 
felt the conviction could open a scenario for a series of public policies and 
paradigmatic laws relating to indigenous people that we have always opposed, 
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for example the rural development law, relating to land ownership, the law for 
sacred sites, that would oblige owners to permit access to land where 
indigenous sites existed, and the law for consultations to indigenous 
communities, including for projects relating to mining and resource 
extraction’.lxx  
 
This statement permits us to decipher why CACIF and perhaps other members of the 
political and economic elite, including the Twelve Apostles, were willing to accept a 
sentence for crimes against humanity, but aggressively opposed a genocide conviction. 
In this case, a genocide conviction would obligate the acknowledgement of racism in 
Guatemala; by acknowledging racism, a modern state should be compelled to make 
profound changes in public policy and legislation, changes that would challenge the 
hegemony of the country’s racist oligarchy. The verdict brought the unravelling of 
Guatemala’s historical, racially imposed order. 
 
The impact of the overturning of the trial in this regard is as unequivocal as it is broad. 
Collins (2010; 2013) has argued that, elsewhere in Latin America, trials for past 
violations may not guarantee the repudiation of the guilty individual, much less of their 
political project. In Guatemala, post-authoritarian change had ultimately been limited; 
in this case, the overturning of the trial has polarised the country yet more profoundly 
and made the risk of losing further ground in human rights protection a reality. A 
critical impact of the trial in this respect has been the recrudescence of racism in 
Guatemala, a strengthening of the regime of genocide denial. Furthermore, the political 
and economic project that Montt represented has been consolidated as a consequence 
of the CC’s decision. The alliance between economic, military and political elites has 
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been, albeit perhaps temporarily restored, and the actions of the military and private 
sector have once again gone unchallenged and unchecked, ultimately weakening the 
rule of law. The CC’s decision has also further evidenced and arguably strengthened 
divisions within the justice system, bolstering and legitimising the lack of 
independence of the judiciary. Said processes have also debilitated what was already a 
fragile and incipient rights culture built up since the peace process. In consequence, the 
ultimate impact of the overturning of the trial has been to weaken post-authoritarian 
change and make further transformation yet more complicated, signifying that both the 
peace process and democratisation have suffered a dramatic rollback.  
 
Final Considerations: the Meaning of the Genocide Trial 
 
The contention in this research has been that recent developments within the legal 
system played a key role in forging the immediate conditions in which the genocide 
trial was held and the guilty verdict won. However, the fundamental driving force 
behind the case and ensuing prosecution were the social and political processes 
induced by indigenous and non-indigenous actors alike during, and in the aftermath of 
the peace process. Taking advantage of the political space engendered by the 
negotiations, collective mobilisations of the AJR-CALDH were able to interrupt the 
narrative of denial and disrupt the power dynamic imposed by elite parties and spoilers 
directly implicated in the perpetration of the genocide. Within this context, the 
achievement of a guilty verdict was all the more significant given that, as one 
interviewee observed, ‘justice for genocide was achieved, albeit fleetingly, during the 
presidency of an ex-General implicated in the violence in the Ixil and against a military 
that had emerged victorious from the conflict, believing its actions in defeating the 
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guerrilla had been vindicated’.lxxi The indictment attests then to the partial success of 
the peace process; to a seeming checkmate imposed upon the military by the human 
rights community. 
 
Checkmate was soon inverted, however, and the annulment of the trial has both 
imperilled those advances achieved and consolidated the position of spoiling actors. It 
has also evidenced the incompleteness of the negotiations across two key aspects. 
Firstly, their failure to consolidate meaningful social and political transformation, in 
particular with regards to their objective of securing social reconciliation between 
conflicting parties and within society. In this context, it would not be an embellishment 
to state that the Cold War is still being fought in Guatemala. Three decades after the 
end of the massacres, the trial has exposed how Guatemalans have still not agreed upon 
the meta-narrative of the conflict: unsurprisingly, Guatemala’s past remains contested. 
Secondly, the trial has demonstrated the failure of the accords and of the democratic 
system to guarantee, in general, the construction of the rule of law, and, in particular, 
that elites agree to and play by the rules of the game, a central aspect of both 
democracy and stable post-conflict scenarios. The annulment responds to a context in 
which indigenous communities, empowered in the aftermath of the negotiations, had 
begun to challenge their historical exclusion, to flatten the proverbial playing field. As 
an indigenous leader explained, ‘The finca economy still imposes itself, but we have 
started to consolidate both models of citizenship and the emergence of indigenous 
presence across small business, education, politics and state bureaucracy. They still 
won’t let us be Ministers or bosses, but the spider’s web, the ivy, is consuming the 
building slowly. But this indigenous empowerment represents a threat’.lxxii 
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If, at all, a legal trial may have a bearing upon national identity, then the Montt 
prosecution has done just that, exposing how the struggle to clarify historical and legal 
truth is related intimately to the discursive construction of the imagined community. In 
this case, the guilty verdict wrote indigenous victims into history, legitimised their 
claims, their selfhood; the annulment of the trial sought to annihilate this presence, to 
obliterate indigenous collective memory, to disrupt political agency.lxxiii The Montt 
prosecution became, symbolically, a theatre of war in which the battle was waged both 
to delineate Guatemala’s past and to demarcate and circumscribe the country’s hitherto 
racially defined economic and political trajectory and, specifically, the role of the 
indigenous other in that future. The economic and political elite continues to refuse to 
relinquish its racially determined privileges to entitlement. In this respect, the actions 
to annul the trial were an extension of the genocide itself, representing ‘a radical 
solution to the perception of an unacceptable, indeed intolerable, historical 
circumstance’.lxxiv Order thus shall not be undone. 
 
According to a CALDH employee, ‘The annulment does not take away the verdict 
from us, from the victims. Montt was indicted; genocide was proved in a court of law. 
That is historical fact’.lxxv However, the implications of the annulment of the trial may, 
in fact, be significant, extending beyond the albeit crucial collective perceptions of 
truth and justice. Midlarsky has argued that the ‘validation’ of mass violence may 
increase the possibility that atrocities reoccur in the future. According to Midlarsky, 
‘Validation occurs when morally repugnant and heinous behaviours result in few, if 
any, negative consequences for the perpetrators’; in short, when ‘egregious acts are 
ignored, or there is an absence of consequences or punishment for them’.lxxvi The 
message that the annulment of the trial sends to the military specifically, and society 
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more generally, is that risks for perpetrators remain minimal and, significantly, that 
violations against the indigenous community will not be punished, on the contrary, 
they have been validated. In this regard, the annulment has undermined and shattered 
the objective to dignify the victims of the conflict, so embedded in the accords.  
 
The proclivity to write indigenous people out of history, to validate egregious violence 
against them, is acutely permissive in Guatemala because, as scholar Patrick Hayden 
has argued, ‘rights claims remain politically irrelevant or ineffective if they are 
unheard and unseen by others who do not recognise the claimant as sufficiently 
human’.lxxvii The trial against Montt and Sánchez evidenced how, in the case of 
Guatemala, the basic condition of the ‘recognition’ of indigenous peoples has not yet 
been achieved, even in spite of the critical gains accomplished since the negotiations. 
As one indigenous leader stated, ‘In a country of indians, they massacred indians, not 
human beings. Today, little has changed.’lxxviii The systematic massacres central to the 
genocide ended in 1984. However, indigenous Guatemalans today suffer extreme 
poverty, exclusion and disproportionate rates of maternal mortality and chronic infant 
malnutrition. Extractive projects, in turn, precipitate displacement and expropriation of 
traditional lands. Structural violence then is slowly eliminating indigenous selfhood 
and community. In the aftermath of the unearthing of Guatemala’s genocide, 
indigenous resistance struggles today look simultaneously towards the past, to break 
the regime of denial and etch justice, whilst looking forward, towards recognition and 
survival. In this context, the genocide ending still remains elusive. 
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